Sun, 25 Sep 2011 07:28:33 +0900WeeblySat, 24 Sep 2011 11:39:36 +0900http://www.samwindley.com/1/post/2011/09/understanding-racism.html
In a recent article at The Drum, Associate Professor Philip Mendes accuses the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement of "political anti-Semitism". Mendes's argument, however, exhibits a profound misunderstanding of racism.

This essay begins by discussing the definitions of racism and anti-Semitism, reminding the reader that the concepts of "race" and "Jewishness" are socially constructed and have no place in our political discourse. It then assesses the so-called "one-state" and "two-state" solutions, exposing the racism that is inherent in the latter. Finally, it analyses Philip Mendes's definition of "political anti-Semitism" and responds individually to each of the accusations Mendes levels at the BDS movement.

Racism

Racism is the (false) assertion of a certain type of difference between individuals. It is often forgotten that racism is objectionable not (only) because it is morally wrong, but because it is empirically wrong. Racism presumes the existence and immutability of a distinction between human beings that simply does not exist. This is not to say that "race" does not exist; as a social construct that has material effects on people's lives, "race" is extremely real.[1] It is to say, however, that assertions of difference based on "race" are demonstrably illusory, and to the extent we wish to base our political discourse on truth, such assertions of difference must not be tolerated.[2]

Of course, racism is not the only false assertion of difference that threatens our political discourse. However, it does have two characteristics that make it particularly insidious.

First, racism is the false assertion of a genetic difference,[3] such that assertions of racial difference do not allow for the possibility that people may change their "race". In contrast, most assertions of religious difference (which are similarly false, or at least indeterminate to the point of being meaningless), allow for the possibility that people may change their "religion". This does not mean that assertions of religious difference should be permitted to inhabit our political discourse, but it does mean that assertions of religious difference are qualitatively distinct from assertions of racial difference, and to lose sight of the immutable aspect of "race" (as it has been socially constructed) would be a step in the wrong direction.

Second, assertions of racial difference have played such a major role in the historical development of most societies (including our own) that our current social situation is very much "racialised". In other words, past assertions of racial difference have affected the structure and operation of our society in fundamental ways. This makes it more difficult for us to accept that assertions of racial difference are false and undesirable, because to do so is to disavow much of our society's moral legitimacy and coherence. And even when we are willing to accept that assertions of racial difference are false and undesirable, our racialised social situation makes it more difficult for us to detect such assertions.[4]

For these reasons, the word "racism" is a valuable one. It allows us to distinguish between assertions of racial difference and other false assertions of difference (which may be less insidious). Furthermore, using "racism" to refer to false assertions of difference that are not assertions of racial difference dilutes the meaning of the word "racism" and therefore diminishes our chances of purging our political discourse of false assertions of racial difference.

Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism, like racism, is the false assertion of a certain type of difference. However, the type of difference it asserts is a difference between "Jews" and "non-Jews", and since it is anti-Semitism, we can further define the difference as one that implies inferiority on the part of "Jews".[5]

For added complexity, the socially-constructed meaning of "Jewishness" cannot be classified as either purely racial or purely religious. But in the context of Israel/Palestine, the racial component of the socially-constructed meaning of "Jewishness" is dominant. This is evident, for example, in Philip Mendes's statement that: 80% of Israel's population are "Jewish in national and cultural identity" while the remainder are "Arab or otherwise [not-Jewish]" (emphasis added).

By using the phrase "Jewish in national and cultural identity" (rather than "Jewish in ethnicity or religion", for example), Mendes avoids drawing attention to the racial component of "Jewishness", and gives the impression that "Jewishness" encompasses everyone who identifies as "Jewish". But this is plainly false, since whether or not someone identifies as "Jewish" is irrelevant to whether they are eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return, for example. To be considered "Jewish" under that law a person must either have a certain type of hereditary connection to someone who is considered "Jewish" (this is the racial component of "Jewishness") or have undergone a formal conversion process (this is the religious component). And the Law of Return is just one of many Israeli laws that distinguishes between "Jews" and "non-Jews" in a way that ignores self-identity.

When discerning the socially-constructed meaning of a term, it is not sufficient to look at how that term is defined by law, so Mendes is right to imply that "Jewishness" has cultural connotations. However, if by using the term "cultural identity" Mendes means to imply that "Jewishness" merely refers to a way of life or a set of cultural practices, he is dramatically downplaying the significance that is afforded to the racial component of "Jewishness" in cultural contexts.

Mendes is also right to refer to "Jewishness" as a national identity, but by defending the "Jewish nationality and identity" of Israel, he treats the concept of national identity as if it were benign. Of course, the exact opposite is true. National identity is the false assertion of difference writ large, since it tethers membership of an imagined community to endorsement of a distinction between members and non-members. As a result, national identity can be a powerfully discriminatory social phenomenon. In fact, the discriminatory potential of nationalism is laid bare in Israel, where it is often said that the state exists for the benefit of the Jewish nation, not Israeli citizens (see the discussion here, for example).[6]

One-State and Two-State Solutions

Perhaps the most misleading aspect of Mendes's article is his characterisation of the so-called "one-state" and "two-state" solutions. In a breathtaking piece of sophistry, he writes that a two-state solution would "respect[] the national and human rights of both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs" while a one-state solution would be "the elimination of the existing state of Israel, and its replacement by an Arab State of Greater Palestine in which Jews at best will be allowed to remain as a tolerated religious, but not national, minority."

The fatal theoretical flaw in most proposed two-state solutions is that they assert a racial difference between "Jews" and "Arabs". In other words, they are racist. Two-state solutions that are based solely on geography have been proposed, but for Mendes (and the majority of Western governments), the only acceptable two-state solution is one in which Israel continues to be defined as a "Jewish state" that exists for the benefit of the "Jewish nation".

Given the racial component of "Jewishness", it is unquestionably racist to define a state in this way, and a state that existed "for the benefit of Palestinians", for example, would be similarly racist. Furthermore, since Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights expressly precludes distinctions with respect to "race", there is no sound basis for Mendes's assertion that a two-state solution would respect human rights.

Although less relevant to the theme of this essay, it is important to note that most "two-state solutions" also suffer from a serious practical flaw, i.e. what to do about the many hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens who live and work in the Occupied Territories. Annexation of the vast network of Israeli-only roads and settlements would make a mockery of any prospective Palestinian state, since the "state" would consist of nothing more than a scattered collection of non-contiguous bantustans.

The only viable option would be to include the settlements in a prospective Palestinian state, but given the extreme inequalities that currently exist between those living in the settlements and those living in Palestinian Authority-controlled areas of the Territories, it is difficult to imagine how the collective resources of that prospective state would be fairly allocated. It also seems unlikely that Israel would be willing to donate the industrial facilities, leisure centres, cultural centres, housing estates, etc., that it has funded or subsidised, to a prospective Palestinian state.

Mendes disingenuously declares that a one-state solution would require "the elimination of the existing state of Israel". All a one-state solution would actually require is: (1) changing the borders of Israel to include the Occupied Territories; and (2) changing the definition of Israel to make it a state that exists for the benefit of all its inhabitants. Mendes falsely presumes that by characterising these two changes as the "elimination" of Israel, he is providing a reason to see them as undesirable.

A limited analogy could be made to the debate over whether Australia should become a republic. Some people may believe that redefining Australia as a republic could be characterised as "the elimination of the existing state of Australia". However, the expression of such a belief would not be a meaningful contribution to the public debate without an explanation of why the redefinition of Australia as a republic would be undesirable.

Although Mendes does not elaborate on why he believes changes (1) and (2) to the definition of Israel would be undesirable, the answer may be discerned from his prediction that a redefined Israel would be "an Arab State of Greater Palestine in which Jews at best will be allowed to remain as a tolerated religious, but not national, minority". This characterisation of a redefined Israel appears to reveal Mendes's adherence to the belief that Israel must always be defined as a "Jewish state" and must always maintain a "Jewish" demographic majority. Yet this belief is plainly racist, since it asserts a difference between "Jews" and "non-Jews".

The standard "justification" for the racist nature of this belief is: the persecution that "Jews" have been (and continue to be) subjected to is so severe that a state must always exist in which "Jews" are the demographic majority. (Mendes's endorsement of Israel's creation as "an affirmative action state" implies that he supports this argument.). A subsidiary argument is that anti-Semitism is especially prevalent among "Arabs", such that there is no way "Jews" could be safe from persecution (or even violent oppression) in a state with an "Arab" demographic majority.

The flaw in these arguments, however, is that they reinforce false assertions of racial difference. In other words, by presuming the existence of racial differences, they legitimise racism.

At its heart, Israel/Palestine is about the extent to which we are willing to allow racism to inhabit our political discourse. For example, let us assume that there are a group of people who wish to rid the world of "Jews" (as they perceive the meaning of that term). There are many ways in which a state could attempt to prevent this group from achieving their objective, but the important question is whether strategies that rely on false assertions of difference (particularly racial difference) would be acceptable.

Perhaps we know that most members of this murderous group are individuals who fall within the socially-constructed category "Arabs". Would this knowledge justify a law that prohibited "Arabs" from congregating in groups? One way of answering this question would be to weigh the likely benefits to the security of "Jews" against the harm that would likely be done to the freedom of innocent "Arabs". We could then conclude that either the likely benefits outweigh the likely harm or vice versa.

However, the very terms of this debate are racist, since they falsely assert the existence of a racial difference. If we were truly serious about purging racism from our political discourse, we would not debate whether the likely benefits of the proposed law outweigh its likely harm; rather, we would recognise that the proposed law is incoherent because it distinguishes between individuals based on "race".

By the same reasoning, the proposal for a two-state solution (where both states are defined on the basis of racial difference) is incoherent, as is Philip Mendes's argument that the BDS movement's preference for a one-state solution is anti-Semitic.

Political Anti-Semitism

Mendes ambiguously defines political anti-Semitism as the "demonis[ation of] Israelis (and their Jewish supporters elsewhere) in ... way[s] that potentially expose[] them to the threat of national destruction by violence or other means". To begin with, it is unclear what Mendes means by "national destruction". As discussed above, a "nation" is an imagined community, membership of which is tied to the endorsement of a particular distinction between members and non-members. Therefore, a "nation" exists only in the minds of those who conceive of themselves as either members or non-members, and could only be said to have been destroyed if everyone stopped conceiving of themselves in that way.

It is clear, then, that a "nation" cannot be destroyed by violence; nor can "national destruction" be "suffer[ed]" by a group of individuals. Accordingly, what Mendes presumably meant by "national destruction" is changes (1) and (2) to the definition of Israel, i.e. a one-state solution. The use of the word "destruction", however, in combination with the words "suffer", "threat", and "violence", creates the misleading impression that a one-state solution is synonymous with the infliction of physical harm on Israelis ("and their Jewish supporters").

So what Mendes is actually claiming is that actions "demonis[ing] Israelis (and their Jewish supporters elsewhere)" are anti-Semitic whenever they intend to "potentially expose[ Israelis] to the threat" of a one-state solution. The logical flaw here is that Israelis are already "potentially expose[d] to the threat" of a one-state solution. In fact, they are not even potentially "expose[d] to [this] threat", but are undoubtedly exposed to it.

Presumably Mendes intended to claim that actions "demonis[ing] Israelis (and their Jewish supporters elsewhere)" are anti-Semitic whenever they are intended to increase the likelihood of a one-state solution. Yet even this generous reformulation of Mendes's definition is flawed. As discussed above, a one-state solution that consists of redefining Israel in accordance with changes (1) and (2) does not assert the existence of a difference between "Jews" and "non-Jews", let alone a difference pertaining to "Jews'" inferiority. Therefore, the fact that an action was intended to increase the likelihood of a one-state solution cannot possibly imply that the action was anti-Semitic.

Nevertheless, it is certainly possible for actions taken with the intention of "demonis[ing] Israelis (and their Jewish supporters elsewhere)" to be anti-Semitic. Mendes's conflation of citizenship ("Israelis") and "race" ("Jewish supporters") obscures the issue, but (as discussed above) the key to detecting anti-Semitism is to ask (i) whether the relevant argument or action asserts the existence of a difference between "Jews" and "non-Jews", and (ii) whether the difference implies that "Jews" are somehow inferior.

BDS and Anti-Semitism

Mendes argues that the BDS movement is guilty of anti-Semitism in six ways. In each case, however, Mendes either mischaracterises the BDS movement, or misconstrues the concept of anti-Semitism.

"[C]all[ing] for the removal of an existing state is unique in international discourse"

The notion of calling for the "removal" of an existing state is nonsensical. A state is an abstract concept that has legal and social meaning, and while it is certainly conceivable that a state could be eliminated or redefined, the idea of "removing" the concept of a state is absurd (remove it from what, for example?).

Mendes also refers to "campaigners call[ing] for the elimination of [Israel] from the ranks of legitimate nation states." The flaw in this statement, however, is that there is no such thing as "the ranks of legitimate nation states". States may seek recognition of their existence from other states, but (as Noam Chomsky has highlighted) international law has no concept of states recognising the right of other states to exist, i.e. their legitimacy.

Furthermore, largely as a result of colonialism, the legitimacy of most states remains contested. Many people challenge Australia's legitimacy, for example, on the basis that the British had no right to colonise a land that was already occupied by an indigenous population. But when faced with such challenges, governments do not typically demand that the rest of the world intervene to confirm the legitimacy of their state; they merely seek international recognition of their existence as a state.

Descendants of the indigenous population of pre-colonial Israel have good historical reasons to challenge Israel's legitimacy. What is unique about the contemporary status of their challenge, then, is not international activists' decision to support a colonised people in their struggle for self-determination, but a colonial power asking the rest of the world to affirm the legitimacy of its colonisation.

"The singling out of Israel cannot be divorced from its Jewish nationality and identity"

It is bizarre to suggest that a state could never be singled out for criticism in a way that is completely independent of its "racial" identity. Some criticisms of Israel certainly have anti-Semitic content or motivations, but to suggest that all criticisms have an anti-Semitic dimension is extremely dangerous, because it inhibits our ability to recognise and denounce those criticisms that are truly anti-Semitic.

"Israeli Jews ... will suffer the most terrible consequences should the BDS campaign be successful"

Mendes believes, not without good reason, that the objective of the BDS movement is to bring about a one-state solution. So what "terrible consequences" does Mendes believe a one-state solution would inflict on "Israeli Jews"? Perhaps the answer can be found earlier in his article, where he implies that "Jews" could not be safe in a state with an "Arab" demographic majority. However, as discussed above, not only is this implication racist, but it also has the potential to reinforce and legitimise racism within our political discourse.

BDS has a "prejudiced impact on Jewish supporters of Israel"

It is unclear what Mendes means by a "prejudiced impact". I presume he is suggesting that BDS campaigning has a more negative impact on "Jewish supporters of Israel" than on "non-Jews" or "people who do not support Israel". But again, what type of impact is he referring to? The example of "prejudiced impact" given by Mendes in his article is the existence of "a climate within the [UK University and College Union (UCU)] which many regard as anti-Semitic". This "climate" was apparently generated by the UCU's passage of BDS motions.

As evidence of an anti-Semitic climate, Mendes refers to the UCU's decision to disassociate itself from the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)'s working definition of anti-Semitism. However, Mendes's statement that the grounds for this decision were "that criticism of Israel cannot possibly be anti-Semitic" is completely dishonest. The full text of the UCU's motion is available here, and it is understandable that Mendes did not provide a link to it in his article, because it undermines his point entirely. As demonstrated by the linked document, the actual grounds for the UCU's decision were that "the EUMC definition confuses criticism of Israeli government policy and actions with genuine antisemitism, and is being used to silence debate about Israel and Palestine on campus."

The reader is invited to review the EUMC definition (available here as a PDF) and judge for themselves whether there is any merit to the UCU's motion. It is worth pointing out, however, that the proviso contained in the working definition ("criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic") is problematic.

The flaw in the proviso is best illustrated using an extreme example. Imagine a situation in which Israel used a nuclear weapon against the population of another state. Now imagine that, in response, certain governments criticised Israel. Would that criticism be "similar" to criticism that had been leveled against any other country? A strong argument could be made that this criticism would be very different to criticism that had been leveled against other countries, but of course the reason for the difference would be the fact that other countries had not used nuclear weapons in similar circumstances; the uniqueness of the criticism would not necessarily be evidence of anti-Semitism on the part of the critics.

At first glance, it appears that another problem with the EUMC's working definition is that the examples listed in the definition are not necessarily examples of anti-Semitism (e.g. drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis; there is nothing necessarily anti-Semitic about this, since it does not assert the existence of a difference between "Jews" and "non-Jews"). However, a close reading of the definition reveals that the listed actions are actually classified as examples of actions that "could" be anti-Semitic, and that is certainly true for the listed actions (as it is true for almost any action). Nevertheless, it is not difficult to comprehend how the inclusion in the EUMC's working definition of these broad examples of possible anti-Semitism could operate, in practice, to inhibit public debate about Israeli government policies.

Mendes also cites the UCU's hosting of the South African trade unionist Bongani Masuku as evidence of an anti-Semitic climate. Mendes characterises Masuku as "an unrepentant anti-Semite", although the only evidence he presents for this characterisation is a finding of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the accusation that Masuku has threatened South African "Jews" with violence or expulsion.

Again, Mendes fails to provide a link to the document he relies on. The relevant finding of the SAHRC appears to be available here, and the basis for Mendes's accusation regarding Masuku threatening "Jews" with expulsion is presumably the email quoted at paragraph [4] of the SAHRC's finding. 

While it is true that the SAHRC found that Masuku's comments amounted to "hate speech" under South African law, the SAHRC's finding contains no evidence of anti-Semitism on the part of Masuku. For example, in none of the remarks extracted by the SAHRC does Masuku assert the existence of a difference between "Jews" and "non-Jews", let alone a difference that implies "Jews" are inferior. In fact, the remarks extracted in the document reveal that Masuku's perspective is so anti-racist that he suggests that anyone who expresses racist beliefs should be forced to leave South Africa (on the basis that racism is illegal under South African law).

While Masuku's proposal for dealing with those who express racist beliefs is highly questionable (both in terms of its likely effectiveness and its morality), it is certainly not anti-Semitic. It is impossible to definitively conclude that Masuku does not hold anti-Semitic views, but it is possible to definitively conclude that the SAHRC's finding against Masuku does not support Mendes's claim that Masuku's perspective is an anti-Semitic one. In fact, the extreme anti-racist nature of Masuku's comments, as extracted in the finding, suggests that anti-Semitism is fundamentally contrary to the beliefs Masuku has publicly expressed, and make it unclear how the decision by the UCU to host Masuku could have generated a climate that was anti-Semitic.

The final evidence Mendes presents in support of an anti-Semitic climate at the UCU is the distribution of racist material by "UCU activists and officials". Obviously such material, if it is truly racist, should be condemned, and the UCU should take steps to prevent its distribution. However, Mendes's link between the distribution of racist materials and BDS is a tenuous one. There is nothing about the methods or objectives of the BDS movement that are necessarily racist. If certain "supporters" of BDS are using racist methods, or have racist objectives, they have misinterpreted the core principles of BDS.

Perhaps it is even true that people holding anti-Semitic views are better represented among "supporters" of the BDS movement than among the general population. However, since BDS is not necessarily racist (and in fact has anti-racist objectives), denouncing BDS in its entirety, on the basis of the views of some of its supporters, would be counter-productive.

The better approach would be to campaign against actual anti-Semitism, and assist the BDS movement to communicate to anti-Semitic "supporters" that anti-Semitism is a false assertion of difference and should therefore be purged from our political discourse. As a practical matter, supporters of BDS who do not hold anti-Semitic views have the potential to be the most effective and powerful opponents of anti-Semitism.

So the case that BDS is responsible for the creation of an anti-Semitic climate at the UCU is weak. Neither the UCU's stance towards the EUMC's working definition of anti-Semitism, nor its hosting of Bongani Masuku, is necessarily anti-Semitic, and may in fact reflect strong anti-racist convictions on the part of the UCU. Furthermore, there is no logical connection between (i) the methods and objectives of the BDS movement, and (ii) UCU activists' participation, if any, in anti-Semitic activities.

Advocates of BDS do not defer to "Jews" regarding the definition of anti-Semitism

And nor should anyone else. On the understanding that the meaning of the concept of "Jewishness" is socially constructed and has no a priori basis in reality, there is no sound reason to entrust "Jews" with responsibility for defining anti-Semitism. In fact, to do so would be racist, since it would constitute an assertion of the existence of a difference between "Jews" and "non-Jews".

BDS "collectively target[s] all Israeli Jews and all Jewish supporters of Israel's existence"

This is perhaps the easiest of Mendes's allegations of anti-Semitism to refute. Anyone who conducts even the most cursory research into the BDS movement (e.g. by reading the introduction here) will see that the methods and objectives of the movement do not assert or assume the existence of a difference between "Jews" and "non-Jews". In contrast, the motivating idea of the BDS movement is that no one (and especially not the Israeli government or the international community) should assert or assume the existence of a such a difference.

Mendes also misleadingly characterises BDS as a campaign against "Israeli-owned businesses", ignoring the fact that the companies being targeted by the BDS movement are not being targeted because of the nationality of their owners, but because they are supporting (and in many cases profiting from) human rights abuses and illegal activities in the Occupied Territories. In fact, many of the businesses targeted by the BDS movement are not Israeli-owned at all (e.g. Lockheed Martin, Caterpillar).

Conclusion

It should be clear from the above discussion that Philip Mendes's criticism of the BDS movement asserts the existence of a difference between "Jews" and "non-Jews" (i.e. it is racist). And while it may be intuitive to want to "protect" people who we perceive as falling into such socially-constructed categories, the real enemy is the categories themselves. Until we have banished false assertions of difference from our political discourse, it will be impossible for us to see each other as nothing more, and nothing less, than human beings.


I have no formal association with the BDS movement, although I actively support a number of BDS-affiliated campaigns.

[1] The term "race" is surrounded by quotation marks throughout this essay to remind the reader that the term refers to a method of differentiating between people that is illusory.

[2] There is an important distinction to be made, however, been assertions of racial difference and recognition of the effects of assertions of racial difference. For example, there is nothing false about recognising that false assertions of racial difference are affecting society is certain (undesirable) ways. Therefore, there is no reason to exclude recognition of this fact from political discourse.

[3] The reader might be tempted to respond that the genetic difference asserted by racism is not a false one, i.e. that there are real genetic differences between "races". However, this is a misconception. First, genetic differences within "races" are generally greater than genetic differences between "races". Second, even if a genetic difference between "races" could be identified, there are so many genetic differences between human beings (e.g. height, eye colour, hair colour), that it would be arbitrary to assign meaning to the genetic difference that corresponds to "race". 

An analogy can be made to gender. It is true that not all humans have the same genitalia. However, it is not possible to derive our contemporary ideas of "male" and "female" from these differences in genitalia, without reference to the path of human development. Gender is therefore another false assertion of difference, not because there are no genetic differences among humans, but because: (1) the function of the concepts "male" and "female" is not limited to recognising differences in genitalia, and (2) the concepts of "male" and "female" are demonstrably socially constructed and cannot be derived a priori from differences in genitalia.

[4] This is not to say that racism is the most insidious of all false assertions of difference. There is plenty of room to argue, for example, that false assertions of gender difference (which also purport to be genetically based) have had just as damaging (if not more damaging) effects on social development and are just as entrenched (if not more entrenched) in our social situation. However, false assertions of gender difference do not tend to arise very frequently in discussions about Israel/Palestine, so they are not the focus of this essay.

[5] Pointing out that anti-Semitism rests on a false premise is not to deny that the socially-constructed notion of "Jewishness" has real consequences for people's everyday lives. It is simply to argue that, if we believe our political discourse should be based on truth, the falsity of perceived differences between "Jews" and "non-Jews" must be affirmed.

[6] Of course, even states that exist for the benefit of their citizens are discriminatory, since they inherently assert an illusory difference between "citizens" and "non-citizens". However, the extent of the harm inflicted by such states depends on the type of difference that is being asserted. For example, a state that granted citizenship to all inhabitants of its geographical territories (and had immigration laws that did not assert false assertions of difference) would surely inflict less suffering on those it excluded (i.e. non-citizens) than a state that defined itself by reference to an illusory racial difference.
]]>